

PLSC 486(H) Domestic Forces in World Politics

Spring 2006

Instructor: A.L. Kimball
Email: akimbal1@binghamton.edu
Office: LN G69 Phone: x76647

Room: RC204
Meets: Wed. 4.40 – 7.40 PM
Office Hours: Wed. 1 – 3 PM

1. Seminar Description:

This course is designed principally to assess the liberal assertion that states are not the “billiard balls” that realists seem to assume as they seek to explain international behavior. Rather, the “black box” of the domestic political process must be opened, as it is an important and relevant determinant of international interactions. While this is the starting point for our reading and discussion, the premise that internal characteristics of states are important to foreign policy behavior is open to debate, and in fact we will read selections that directly contest this presumption.

The course is also founded on the presumption that the scientific study of international processes is a productive research program and that the scientific method can provide us explanations of international behavior and predictions of how states will behave in the future. As a result of this presumption, the reading for the course is drawn predominantly from the empirical political science literature where such scientific methods are routinely employed. Moreover, we will examine the rational choice approach, a set of behavioral assumptions upon which much scientific work in IR are based. As is normally the case in seminars, group discussion will characterize class meetings. As a result, and especially given the small size of the seminar, reading is critical both for students and the instructor. The readings for the seminar include three books and a variety of scholarly, mostly empirical articles from the international relations literature.

Substantively, our efforts will focus on untangling the causes of international behavior, assessing the extent to which domestic factors are important determinants of foreign policy decisions, and deciphering the process of international interactions as it involves domestic politics. These three goals are interrelated especially as the political conditions of one state may send signals to other states, thus influencing how those states behave; moreover, signaling and interpretation in this manner may lead states either to avoid particular types of action or to seek out chances to take action in the international system. These “strategic interactions” sometimes produce “selection effects,” two emergent concepts increasingly important to the development of theories of international relations.

One way to think of this seminar is to consider it a semester-long research agenda aimed toward identifying the nature and extent of the link between domestic and international politics as it is manifested in foreign policy decisions. The analysis of international processes is characterized by disparate approaches. Empirical studies often find convoluted and contradictory relationships that serve largely to deepen the shadows within which the foreign policy process lies. Moreover, insofar as empirical endeavors rarely lead to clear, difficult to refute conclusions, one might suspect that the theoretical story regarding leaders’ incentives and behaviors are incomplete or inadequate to the task of suggesting a more fully specified and accurate empirical model.

2. Readings

Readings for this course will consist of several books and a set of articles (listed by week below). The books for the course are available at the university bookstore.

- Bueno de Mesquita, B. and Lalman, D. (1992). *War and Reason*. Yale University Press, New Haven
- Milner, H. V. (1997). *Interests, Institutions, and Information*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ

Though the list of articles is somewhat lengthy, they will be available through a variety of sources. First, I will post as many as possible on the courses Blackboard website. Second, some books and articles will be made available through the reserve room (RR). Third, articles may also be available electronically via a university computer at www.jstor.org. Finally, you can find many of the articles in the hard copy journals in the library.

3. Course Requirements

Since this is an upper-level seminar course my expectations about the caliber of your work will be high. I expect you to arrive at class prepared to discuss and critique the assigned materials. The amount of reading will vary from week to week but you should generally expect to read about 4 different items each week. Your grade will be based on a set of short papers, your in-class participation, a discussion you lead, and a term paper along with its presentation.

Each student will write a series of THREE short papers worth 10% each (30% total). The short papers should be two or three typed (single-spaced) pages. The main purpose of these papers is to provoke critical thinking about the material and to relay those thoughts in the discussion. Your grade will be based on the quality of your paper but also how you relate the key points of your paper in the seminar. You should access outside sources and literatures as they relate to your paper but outside sources are not required. Papers are due the Monday preceding each class meeting no later than 5 PM via email to the instructor. You are ALSO required to bring a HARD copy of your paper to the seminar for the instructor that Wednesday. The first two papers are due on or before 2/21/06 & 3/28/06 respectively and the final paper is due on/before 5/2/06. Failure to turn in either of those two papers by the due date results in a 25% reduction in the paper grade and papers that are more than 2 weeks late will NOT be graded. You can turn in papers at any time during the semester before the due dates and I encourage you to turn them in early. You may consider the following questions as you read to help you in writing your paper:

What is the author's main argument?; What evidence does the author use to support his or her claim?; How is this argument similar or different from other work we have discussed in class?; What are the strengths and weaknesses of the author's analysis?; Do you agree or disagree with the author?; Can you think of an alternative explanation for the author's evidence?; Is there additional evidence that lends support to, or casts doubt upon, the author's conclusions?; What advice would you give to policy makers based on this reading?

Participation is also critical in the course and will account for 25% of your grade. Attending seminar is necessary for attaining participation points. However, the overall quality of your participation is the most important element and as such your comments should *meaningfully contribute* to the discussion of the material. If you attend and do NOT contribute to the discussion you should expect to receive a 0 for participation for that day. Each student is allowed 1 free absence in the semester.

Each student will be required to help lead the course discussion for one meeting in the semester. You will select one week and present AT LEAST two of the assigned readings. This is worth 10% of your grade. You MUST see the instructor in her office hours the week before you present to review the material and discuss relevant questions to ask (You can NOT receive full credit if you fail to meet with the instructor during the week previous to your assigned discussion week). I will pass around a sheet of paper for you to sign up and to indicate which readings you wish to lead discussion about. There will be two students leading discussion each week.

The final requirement for the course will be a 12 -15 page research analysis paper related to the interdependent relationship between domestic factors and international politics. This paper will be worth a total 35% of your final grade suggesting you need to treat it seriously. I will post on blackboard a separate handout that covers the details of the paper—that is worth 30% of your final grade. I encourage you to think about and start the paper early and you should see me regarding your topic idea by 2/28/06—your paper grade will be penalized if you do not turn in a paper topic. The paper is due at the BEGINNING of class on 4/18/06. It will be penalized one letter grade per day if it is turned in ANY time after the beginning of class. You are required to present your paper during our last class meetings and your presentation will count for 5% of your final grade.

To Summarize--

Short papers – 30% with 3 papers at 10% each

Lead Class Discussion – 10%

Term Paper – 35% (30% paper & 5% presentation)

Participation – 25%

4. Additional Guidelines and Information

• **Plagiarism & Cheating:** Plagiarism and cheating are serious matters that, should they occur, will be pursued to the limits of University rules. Moreover, academic dishonesty will result in a failing grade for the course. For details regarding the University's policy on cheating and plagiarism and academic dishonesty more generally, see the University Handbook. For writing guidelines and information on plagiarism and how to avoid its pitfalls, visit the writing links on the course website. Additionally, students are advised to retain all course material for all course work until two weeks after grades are received.

- Students with Disabilities: Students with disabilities should register with the Office of Services for Students with Disabilities (777–2686). Extra time for exams and other necessary arrangements can be made in conjunction with that office and the instructor.
- Course Website: Please visit the course’s website on Blackboard. It is frequently updated as changes in our schedule are necessary and as lecture outlines and additional reading material or relevant links become available.
- Syllabus: The online version of the syllabus is the official syllabus for this course as it is updated periodically. Visit the course website to view the most recent version of the syllabus.

5. Course Outline and Reading Schedule

Course Outline

A Scientific Framework for Analysis

Week 1 Introduction – The Basics of International Relations

Week 2 Analyzing Political Behavior

Week 3 Empirical & Formal Approaches

Theoretical Debate of the Correlates of International Behavior

Week 4 Liberalism & Realism

Foreign Policy as a Tool in Domestic Politics

Week 5 Domestic & International Sources of Foreign Policy *****Short Paper 1 Due*****

Week 6 Affirmative Views *****Paper topic due*****

Week 7 Contrary Views

Regimes & Constraints

Week 8 No Class – Spring Break

Week 9 Regimes I

Week 10 Regimes II *****Short Paper 2 Due*****

Week 11 International Political Economy

Week 12 Institutions & Interests

Strategic Behavior

Week 13 Selection Effects *****Term Paper Due*****

Week 14 Substitution

Week 15 Student Presentations ****Short Paper 3 Due*****

Week 16 Student Presentations

Week 1 (Jan. 25, 2006) Introduction – The Basics of World Politics

Week 2 (Feb. 1, 2006) Analyzing Political Behavior

- Moore, W. H. (1998a). Evaluating theory in political science. Unpublished manuscript. FSU.
- Moore, W. H. (1998b). Observing the political world: Ontology, truth and science. Unpublished manuscript. FSU.

Week 3 (Feb. 8, 2006) Empirical & Formal Approaches

- Singer, J. D. (1969). The incomplete theorist: Insight without evidence. In Rosenau, J. N. and Knorr, K., editors, *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, pages 63–86. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. (RR)
- Bull, H. (1966). International theory: The case for a classical approach. *World Politics*, 18(3): 361–377
- Bremer, S. A. (1992). Dangerous dyads: Conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war, 1816-1965. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(2): 309–341
- Ray, J. L. (1995). *Democracy and International Conflict*. University of South Carolina Press, Columbia (chapter 4 only) (RR)
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1985). Toward a scientific understanding of international conflict: A personal view. *International Studies Quarterly*, 29:121–136

Week 4 (Feb. 15, 2006) Realism & Liberalism

- APSR Forum, December 1997: Required: Vasquez, Waltz; Recommended: Christensen & Snyder, Elman & Elman, Schweller, and Walt
- Singer, J. D. (1961). The level-of-analysis problem in international relations. *World Politics*, 14(1): 77–92
- Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. *International Organization*, 42(3): 427–461

Week 5 (Feb. 22, 2006) Domestic & International Sources of Foreign Policy

*****Short Paper 1 is Due*****

- Gourevitch, P (1978) "The Second Image Reversed: International Sources of Domestic Politics", *International Organization*. (32) 4: 881-912.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. and Lalman, D. (1992). *War and Reason*. Yale University Press, New Haven –chapters 1-6

Week 6 (Mar. 1, 2006) Foreign Policy as a Tool of Domestic Politics: Affirmative Views

*****Paper Topic is Due*****

- Ostrom, C. W. and Job, B. (1986). The president and the political use of force. *American Political Science Review*, 80:541–566
- Morgan, T. C. and Bickers, K. (1992). Domestic discontent and the use of force. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36:25–52
- Gelpi, C. (1997). Democratic diversions: Governmental structure and the externalization of domestic conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41:255–282
- Fordham, B. (1998a). Partisanship, macroeconomic policy, and U.S. uses of force, 1949-1994. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(4): 418–439
- Lohmann, S. and O'Halloran, S. (1994). Divided government and us trade policy: theory and evidence. *International Organization*, 48:595–632

Week 7 (March 8, 2006) Foreign Policy as a Tool of Domestic Politics: Contrary Views

- Leeds, B. A. and Davis, D. R. (1997). Domestic political vulnerability and international disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41:814–834
- Meernik, J. (1994). Presidential decision making and the political use of military force. *International Studies Quarterly*, 38:121–138
- Gowa, J. (1998). Politics at the water's edge: Parties, voters and the use of force abroad. *International Organization*, 52(2): 307–325
- Clark, D. H. (2003) Can Strategic Interaction Divert Diversionary Behavior? A Model of US Conflict Propensity. *Journal of Politics*. 65(4): 1013–1039.

Week 8 (March 15, 2006) NO Class – Spring Recess

Week 9 (March 22, 2006) Regime I

- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., and Smith, A. (1999). An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. *American Political Science Review*, 93(4): 791–807
- Tarar, A. (2001) "International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 45(3): 320-40.
- Clark, D. and T. Nordstrom. (2005) Democratic Variants and Democratic Variance: How Domestic Constraints Shape Interstate Conflict. *Journal of Politics*. 67(1): 250-270.
AND Select ONE of--
- Smith, A. (1996). Diversionary foreign policy in democratic systems. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(1): 133–54
- Smith, A. (1998). International crises and domestic politics. *American Political Science Review*, 92(3): 623–638

Week 10 (March 29, 2006) Regime II

*****Short Paper 2 is Due*****

- Layne, C. (1994). Kant or cant: The myth of the democratic peace. *International Security*, 19:5–49
- Peceny, M.; C. Beer & S. Sanchez-Terry. (2002) Dictatorial Peace? *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 15-26. (RR)
- Enterline, A. J. (1998) Regime Changes, Neighborhoods, and Interstate Conflict, 1816-1992. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42: 804-829.
- Kimball, A. L. July 2005. Alliance Formation and Conflict Initiation: The Missing Link. *Journal of Peace Research*.

Week 11 (April 5, 2006) International Political Economy

- Rogowski, R. (1987) Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *American Political Science Review* 81(4): 1121-1137.
- Ruggie, J.G. (1982) International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. *International Organization*. 36(2): 379-415.
- Katzenstein, P. (1985) *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell UP. (Ch. 1, 2 & 5) (RR)
- Baldwin, D. A. (1985) *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton: Princeton UP. (Ch. 2, 3 & 6) (RR)

Week 12 (April 12, 2006) Interests & Institutions

- Milner, H. V. (1997). *Interests, Institutions, and Information*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ – (skip ch. 5 & 6)
- Clark, D. H. (2000a). Agreeing to disagree: Domestic institutional congruence, and us dispute behavior. *Political Research Quarterly*, 53(2): 375–401
- Leeds, B. A.. 1999. Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation. *American Journal of Political Science* 43: 979-1002.

Week 13 (April 19, 2006) Strategic Behavior: Selection Effects

*****Term Paper is Due*****

- Reed, W. (2000). A unified statistical model of conflict onset and escalation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(1): 84–93
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., and Zorick, E. (1997). Capabilities, perception, and escalation. *American Political Science Review*, 91:15–27
- Bearce, D. and K. Flanagan. Unpublished manuscript. “Modeling Selection into International Bargaining” University of Pittsburgh.

Week 14 (April 26, 2006) Strategic Behavior: Substitution

- Clark, D. H. (2001). Trading butter for guns: Domestic imperatives for foreign policy substitution. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(5): 636–660
- Enterline, A. J. and Gleditsch, K. S. (2000). Threats, opportunity, and force: Repression and diversion of domestic pressure, 1948-1982. *International Interactions*, 26:21–53
- Clark, D.H. and W. Reed. 2005. The Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution. *American Journal of Political Science*. 49(3): 609-624.

Week 15 (May 3, 2006) Paper Presentations

*****Short Paper 3 is Due*****

Week 16 (May 10, 2006) Paper Presentations